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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the literature on strategic use of debt models and empirically tests the seminal 
models of Persson & Svensson (1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990) on a dataset of Flemish 
municipalities. The literature on strategic use of debt originates from the question whether 
incumbent policy makers change debt if they expect an electoral defeat. We introduce a vote 
function to estimate the probability of electoral defeat and present evidence of strategic debt in line 
with Persson & Svensson (1989), still we only find evidence for leftist governments. Our results also 
show that coalition governments in particular are more likely to change debt strategically. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Though tax-smoothing theory (Barro, 1979) suggests that deficits and surpluses are used to 
minimize the distorting effects of taxation, political economy models not only relate deficits and 
debt to the business cycle; they also point to the role of the timing of elections when framing fiscal 
policy.2 This literature suggests that governments change fiscal policy to attract more votes and to 
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2  Still there are several other political economic models that explain budget deficits, such as the ideological orientation 
and political fragmentation of the government, the form of the budgetary institutions, the degree of government 
stability, and so on. See Franzese (2001) for an excellent overview.  
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increase their chances of getting re-elected.3 But it are not only governments who believe they have 
a good chance of staying in office that may change fiscal policy. An interesting finding is that 
governments expecting to be replaced might adapt fiscal policy too. The time-inconsistency theory 
of politics (see Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Fischer, 1980) predicts that judgements about the 
likelihood of a regime change drive policy changes. A government expecting a regime change may 
opt to follow a second-best policy when this allows to control the fiscal setting of the future 
government. The creation of debt by the previous government puts a constraint on the new 
government that will have no choice but to accept it, possibly having to sacrifice parts of its own 
expenditure programme. This situation is described in the literature on strategic deficit and debt 
behavior. 
 
In this paper we investigate empirically whether strategic debt behavior is present in Flemish 
municipalities. Crucial in empirical tests on strategic debt behavior is to find a good proxy for the 
government‟s expectation of a regime change. For this purpose most previous empirical analyses 
on strategic debt models introduce historical political stability information. The novelty of this 
paper is that the approach taken here is that a variable which measures the probability of electoral 
defeat should be based on the electorate‟s determinants to evaluate the government‟s policy. 
Therefore, we introduce the literature on vote functions to estimate the probability of electoral 
defeat.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is an overview of the relevant literature. 
Section 3 formulates some observations on the present state of the research in this field. Section 4 
introduces the reader in Flemish municipalities and presents models to estimate the probability of 
electoral defeat and to empirically test the presence of strategic use of debt. Some extensions are 
presented in section 5. Finally, concluding comments are given in section 6. 
 
2. The literature 
 
The literature on strategic deficit and debt behavior originates from the question whether 
incumbent policy makers change debt if they expect not to get into office again.  
 
The strategic use of debt literature arises from the paper of Persson & Svensson (1989) 
(henceforth PS model). The PS model argues that voters have heterogeneous preferences 
concerning the size of the government. Some of the voters want the government to provide a 
significant level of public goods, while others are in favour of less government interference. The 
PS model assumes that incumbents adapt to the voters‟ preferences and act accordingly. This 
model predicts rightist governments awaiting a regime switch to run budget deficits up to a much 
                                                 
3  For example Alesina et al. (1992) find evidence of systematic differences in fiscal and monetary policy in pre-election 
years. 
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higher level than when they feel secure about their political future. The idea is to reduce the public 
spending of the following (leftist) government by creating more debt. Higher levels of debt bring 
along higher interest charges and thus reduce the scope for policymaking of the next government. 
The opposite reaction is expected when a leftist government anticipates a regime change. Leftist 
governments traditionally favour higher public expenditures. The PS model predicts that leftist 
governments will run a budget surplus if they know they will be succeeded by a rightist 
government. This budget surplus enlarges the budget of the succeeding rightist government and 
induces it to spend more than it otherwise would have.  
 
The theoretical work of Persson & Svensson (1989) was followed by the contribution of Alesina & 
Tabellini (1990) (henceforth AT model), also theoretical in nature. This paper also emphasizes 
strategic considerations in the formation of debt policy, but from a different viewpoint. While the 
PS model focuses on the level of spending, the AT model assumes that governments differ with 
respect to their preferences concerning the composition of government spending. Again this is a 
reflection of the voters‟ preferences. When the government expects to be replaced, it runs a budget 
deficit which will bring the composition of future public spending closer to its preferences. In fact, 
the deficit allows the current government to spend more on public goods than it prefers by 
reducing future spending on the public goods it gets little utility from. Consider, for example, a 
government which prefers spending on education to road construction and assume that it expects 
to be replaced by a government with the opposite preferences. The current government could 
expect that spending on education will be cut by the next government. Therefore it can opt to run 
up a deficit and spend the extra resources on education as an advance on the spending cut in 
education that will follow with the take-over of the next government. Today‟s government thus 
ties the hands of future governments by allocating future tax revenues to service debt. The 
marginal cost of repaying the additional debt falls thus on the preferences of the new government, 
about which the departing government cares little.  
 
The AT model expects a deficit bias irrespective of the government‟s political ideology; that is, 
regardless of the government‟s political preferences, the existence of a strong likelihood of being 
voted out of office will generate an incentive to issue debt. The AT model thus yields a symmetric 
prediction on the role of the probability of electoral defeat. The PS model‟s prediction, on the 
other hand, is non-symmetric. This model predicts that only right-wing governments issue debt. So 
whereas in the AT model the probability to be voted out of office raises debt per se, this is only 
the case for right-wing governments in the PS model.  
 
The AT and PS model differ with respect to the assumptions made concerning the utility functions 
of the parties. They both assume that the political polarization and the likelihood of a regime 
switch are major determinants of the pre-electoral debt policy. Fiscal policy will thus be more 
volatile when governments expect to be replaced than when they don‟t. 
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Various authors have extended, criticized or empirically tested the PS and AT models.4 Lockwood 
et al. (1996) build on the PS model. They assume that two parties alternate in power and have 
different preferences over the level of public good provision. Lockwood et al. (1996) innovate in 
assuming that incumbents do not care about –or care sufficiently little about– policy outcomes 
when not in power. Parties in power thus are expected to be myopic near the end of their term of 
office. Incumbents have the incentive to finance their expenditures by issuing debt, knowing that 
they will not have to face the consequences of debt financing for a while the so-called “quasi-
finite horizon effect”. According to Lockwood et al. (1996), this implies that pre-electoral debt 
expansion is dominating the strategic effects of the PS model, so that in their models strategic 
effects appear of only secondary importance. Incumbents only have an incentive to use debt 
strategically to affect their successor‟s tax and spending decisions insofar as it influences the level 
of debt that the (current) incumbent party will inherit when it is next returned to power. So, 
predominantly, the “quasi-finite horizon effect” rules.  
 
The Martimort (2001) model contradicts the expectations of the PS model. The major 
contribution of the Martimort (2001) model is that it stresses the strategic role of budget deficits 
when parties differ only with respect to their redistributive concerns5. According to Martimort 
(2001), political regime switching introduces fluctuations in the distribution of utility in the 
economy. These fluctuations justify strategic budget distortions by governments currently in office 
and willing to favour their redistributive concerns against the policies of a future government. 
Contrary to the PS model, Martimort (2001; 573) expects “leftist governments to be more inclined 
to redistribute income. By running a deficit today, the leftist government ensures that society gets 
poorer tomorrow. A future rightist government will have to redistribute more. The implemented 
tax policy will thus be close to what a leftist government would have chosen itself. On the 
contrary, by running a surplus today, a rightist government relaxes the burden of taxation imposed 
by tomorrow‟s leftist government on high income agents. This leftist government will be less eager 
to redistribute and will adopt the rightist party‟s behavior.” 
 
For empirical research on strategic debt models, we refer to the findings of Pettersson-Lidbom 
(2001), Lockwood et al. (1996), Carmignani (2003), Crain & Tollison (2003), Grilli et al. (1991), 
Lambertini (2003), Franzese (2001) and Ashworth et al. (2005). 
 
                                                 
4  Aghion & Bolton (1990), Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Milesi-Ferretti & Spolaore (1994) also present models that explain 
the strategic use of debt, but from another point of view. These authors assume that budget deficits are used 
strategically to influence election outcome. They focus on the impact of debt decisions on the probability of getting re-
elected, while in the seminal strategic debt models of AT and PS –the subject of our analysis– the causality is inverse. 
Therefore we do not go more deeply into these papers. 
5  While each type of government maximizes a social welfare function, a rightist government prefers more allocative 
efficiency and less redistribution than a leftist government. 
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Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) and Lockwood et al. (1996) present evidence consistent with the PS 
model. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) examines the accumulation of debt by Swedish local 
governments and finds significantly positive effects of the probability of electoral defeat on the 
accumulation of debt. Using a dataset of 277 municipalities for the period 1974 to 1994, 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds strong differences between right- and left-wing governments. As 
expected by the PS model, right-wing governments accumulate more debt (+15%) when facing a 
higher probability of defeat, whereas the opposite occurs for left-wing governments (-11%). 
Lockwood et al. (1996) not only build on the PS model theoretically but also test their hypotheses 
empirically. Using annual data for the United Kingdom on government debt (and taxes and 
expenditures) for the period 1956 to 1996, their empirical findings are largely consistent with the 
theoretical expectations (as described earlier). 
 
Carmignani (2003) and Crain & Tollison (1993) build on the AT model and find empirical support 
for it. For a sample of western European democracies, Carmignani (2003) shows that government 
instability when it involves a replacement of decision-makers increases the size of deficits.6 
Crain & Tollison (1993) employ data from U.S. states covering the period 1968 to 1989 and report 
that as the likelihood of a government change increases, the volatility of fiscal measures –and 
specifically taxes and the surplus/deficit levels– increases. 
 
Other empirical studies by Grilli et al. (1991), Lambertini (2003), Franzese (2001) and Ashworth et 
al. (2005) find no significant evidence for the strategic use of debt or deficits. Grilli et al. (1991) 
investigate the reasons for the existence of differences in the debt-to-GNP-ratio in 18 OECD 
countries over the period 1960-1989, but find no evidence that supports the PS or AT models. 
Lambertini (2003) uses U.S. (1960-1995) and pooled data for 16 OECD countries (1960-1992) to 
test both the PS model and the AT model. For the U.S. dataset opinion polls are used to measure 
the probability of being voted out of office, while for OECD countries a probit equation on the 
probability of government change is estimated. For the AT model, Lambertini (2003) tests whether 
government outlays on defence are higher under more conservative governments and whether 
government expenditures on social security and welfare are higher under more liberal 
governments. For the PS model, Lambertini (2003) investigates whether cyclically adjusted 
government budget surpluses are lower under conservative than liberal governments. Results show 
that there is no evidence that confirms the expected effects, irrespective of the model adopted (AT 
or PS). For none of the datasets as measured by Lambertini (2003) does the probability of being 
voted out of office have a significant effect on the government budget surplus. 
 
                                                 
6  We find no further information on the entities or on the time period of Carmignani‟s (2003) dataset. Carmignani (2003; 
2) only mentions that the sample comprises western European democracies. At the end of the paper Carmignani (2003; 
38) also remarks that the size of the sample is relatively small and that the panel is a pooled cross-section time series. 
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Franzese (2001) examines the political determinants of debt and deficits for 21 OECD-countries 
and, like Lambertini (2003), rejects the predictions of strategic use of debt models. Franzese‟s 
(2001) bivariate analysis shows that his “risk replacement variable” does not correlate with debts or 
deficits. As Franzese (2001) points out himself, a bivariate analysis is actually inapt to explore 
conditional hypotheses like strategic use of debt theories. More importance, he argues, should be 
attached to his multivariate analyses. His multivariate model, however, provides no support for 
strategic debt policy. The risk replacement variable is marginally significant and suggests that the 
probability of being voted out of office provokes governments to engage in debt policy 
manipulation, but contrary to the PS model, leftist governments increase and rightist governments 
decrease deficits when the replacement risk increases.  
 
Finally, Ashworth et al. (2005) examine the impact of government fragmentation on local 
government indebtness in Flemish municipalities for the period 1977-2000. Their analysis shows 
no significant impact of the number of excess seats of the ruling parties on local debt. Therefore 
they conclude that the lack of a significant impact “indicates a lack of evidence for strategic debt 
usage in Flanders”.  
 
To summarize, the empirical evidence in the literature shows no consensus on whether or not the 
incumbent‟s probability of being voted out of office explains pre-electoral debt policy.  
 
3. Discussion 
 
Although different models provide theoretical explanations for budget deficit or debt changes, the 
empirical evidence is relatively weak. This does not necessarily mean that the strategic models can 
be refuted. But some observations can be made. 
 
First, the empirical disagreement indicates that fiscal decisions are the outcome of a more 
complicated political process. Variables other than the probability of being voted out of office also 
seem to matter for fiscal policy. Lambertini (2003) suggests that macro-economic and other 
exogenous events not accounted for in the PS or AT models also explain budget deficits or 
surpluses. To reduce the impact of these exogenous events, it might be advisable to look for 
evidence of the strategic use of debt behavior on single-country data, so that the impact of these 
types of events is constant over all observations. Consequently it is not coincidental that 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds evidence of the existence of the strategic use of debts when 
analysing Swedish municipalities.  
 
Second, we could question whether evidence of the strategic use of debt models can be found 
outside two-party systems or similar situations. The AT model is developed in a two-party 
environment. The PS model explains the behavior of “a” rightist government expecting to be 
replaced by “a” leftist government or vice versa, but gives no consideration to the precise 
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composition of each government. The empirical tests that support the strategic use of debt models 
have all been performed on governments operating within a two-party system.7 But what if more 
than two parties are running for government? On the one hand the strategic use of fiscal policy 
could become less attractive the larger the coalition becomes. This is because increasing debt 
might reduce the future policy options of one or more of the coalition partners who might return 
to office as members of a new coalition. This is not unlikely in coalition governments since the 
probability that at least one of the members stays in office increases the higher the number of 
coalition partners. Grilli et al. (1991) also point out that changes in coalition governments are rarely 
due to a total breakdown of the underlying coalition. On the other hand, Ashworth et al. (2006) 
state that parties in a coalition are on average less certain of future power than parties not sharing 
power. Indeed, coalition parties not only have to „win‟ the elections; they also have to survive the 
ensuing coalition negotiations. Hence, their shorter time horizon may lead coalition governments 
to be more sensitive to the strategic use of debt. Consequently fragmented governments are 
expected to more strongly (and consciously) engage in debt creation in election years. The role of 
fragmentation in strategic debt models thus should be clarified. 
 
Third, the theoretical PS model assumes that incumbents know that they will be replaced. What 
about the situation when electoral uncertainty leads to uncertainty about the nature of succeeding 
governments? Although Persson & Svensson (1989; 342) conjecture that uncertainty about 
whether the current government will remain in power or not would not fundamentally change 
their findings, Alesina & Tabellini (1990) introduce uncertainty in their theoretical model. In fact, 
empirical models also differ from the PS model and introduce a variable that measures the 
probability of electoral defeat to take into account uncertainty. Reviewing the literature, we find as 
many approaches to calculating that probability as there are empirical studies on the strategic use 
of debt. In addition to differences in model specification –such as time period, sample or 
differences in the definition of what is seen as deficit or debt– we suggest that the definition of the 
crucial variable concerning re-election prospects may explain the inconsistency in the empirical 
findings. We do not dispute that what moves governments to act strategically (or not) before 
elections is their assessment of upcoming electoral outcomes. We only address disagreement in the 
construction or measurement of that crucial variable. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
The setting of our empirical analysis follows from the considerations above. We empirically test 
the existence of strategic debt models on single-country data. Our dataset consists of  294 Flemish 
municipalities covering four election periods (1982, 1988, 1994 and 2000). Though there are 308 
                                                 
7  Although Swedish local governments operate in a multi-party system, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001; 575, footnote 10) 
reduces his dataset to a two-party environment, only taking into account strict left- or right-wing governments. 
Undefined governments, that is when neither left-wing nor right-wing parties constitute a majority, are removed from 
the dataset. 
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municipalities, data unavailability precludes the use of more than these 294. In Flemish 
municipalities multiple parties with various ideological characteristics compete for office in a 
system of proportional representation. Therefore our analysis will take into account ideological 
differences as well as possible fragmentation effects. Finally, we take into account uncertainty 
about future government participation. Our crucial variable to proxy the probability of electoral 
defeat is not constructed ad hoc, but is derived from the literature on vote functions. 
 
First we discuss some characteristics of Flemish local governments. Second we introduce a vote 
function to proxy the probability of electoral defeat. Third we test the presence of strategic use of 
debt in Flemish municipalities. Finally some extensions to the analyses are presented. 
 
4.1 Flemish municipalities 
 
Flemish local governments have a parliamentary system consisting of the local council (the 
legislative body) and the College of Mayor and Alderman (the executive body). Seats in the council 
are allocated using a system of proportional representation. The composition of the College is 
determined by the party (or parties) holding a majority position in the council. Elections are hold 
every 6 years and incumbents can be indefinitely re-elected (i.e. there are no binding term limits).  
 
Flemish municipalities enjoy a far-reaching autonomy in their fiscal policies. Taxation and grants 
from higher levels of government (which are for the most part unconditional) are important 
sources of revenue. Expenditures may also be financed through debt-financing. Flemish 
municipalities can arrange public loans, still they borrow almost exclusively from private banks.  
 
The fiscal year runs parallel to the civil year in Belgium (from 1 January to 31 December). Prior to 
the fiscal year, a balanced budget needs to be agreed upon. The presentation of the budget is a 
responsibility of the College. The budget is discussed by the College of Mayor and Alderman and 
is brought before the local council for ratification. Only when the budget is endorsed before 31 
December, it can be executed.   
 
4.2 Expectation of electoral defeat 
 
The strategic debt models assume that governments that expect to be replaced will change debt 
before elections. Crucial in these models is the introduction of a measure for the probability of 
electoral defeat. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), Carmignani (2003) and Lambertini (2003) create each a 
–different– auxiliary equation that links the unobserved variable, that is, the expectation of 
electoral defeat, to a set of observable variables that might be expected to affect the probability of 
electoral defeat. The Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) set of explanatory variables is restricted to 
historical voting patterns and the frequency of previous government changes. Franzese (2001), 
Grilli et al. (1991), Ashworth et al. (2005) and Crain & Tollison (1993) also use historical stability 
variables. Franzese (2001) launches a “replacement risk variable”, which is simply the inverse of 
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the actual duration in years of the incumbent‟s mandate, i.e., the hazard rate of losing office in a 
year. Grilli et al. (1991) use the frequency of government changes in the past, while Crain & 
Tollison (1993) measure the probability of no regime change from historical seats shares. 
Ashworth et al. (2005) use the number of seats in excess of a simple majority (since previous 
elections). Carmignani (2003) estimates the probability of government termination by a probit 
analysis with different variables. Besides the stability of the government in the previous year, 
political fragmentation, political polarization and GDP growth in the current and previous year are 
introduced into the equation. Lambertini (2003) introduced two constructs to estimate a 
government‟s prospects. She first estimates an index of political affiliation of the government, 
calculated on election dates, change-of-government dates, the direction of the change in 
government and the ideological position of the government. A change in the value of the index is 
thus a change in the government in the Lambertini (2003) model. Secondly, in her analysis on U.S. 
data, she introduces opinion polls as proxy for the probability of electoral defeat.8  
 
Different authors used different methods to estimate the probability of electoral defeat. The 
question of what a good proxy might be remains open. We are conscious that the real expected 
probability of re-election or electoral defeat is hard to measure. The literature so far is focused on 
historical political stability determinants only. As well as these, other determinants, such as 
economic, tax and political variables, may explain whether incumbents get re-elected or not. 
Ultimately, when judging the probability of electoral defeat, incumbents need to assess voters‟ 
likely behavior in the voting booth. It thus becomes important for incumbents to evaluate the 
relevant determinants that voters have in mind when voting for or against the current government. 
The determinants of voting behavior have been studied intensively in the literature on vote 
functions (see e.g. Paldam & Schneider, 1980; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994, Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 
2000; Revelli, 2002; Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; Geys & Vermeir, 2008). In general these functions 
explain the vote (or the change in the vote) for the government at elections by (the change in) 
political, economic and tax variables (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). Though part of the political 
variables are historical stability variables, vote functions are not restricted to these. 
 
The novelty of this paper is that we introduce a vote function to measure the expectation of the 
probability of electoral defeat. Mughan (1987; 198) makes clear that the primary purpose of vote 
functions should be forecasting –“predicting the outcome of an event before it occurs”– instead of 
explaining. Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) also show that a model based on the insights from 
electoral research could be a good instrument to predict the level of votes cast for incumbents. In 
                                                 
8  We do not dispute the accuracy of opinion polls, but we are not convinced that this is the best proxy for the 
government‟s expectation of electoral defeat in a multiparty system. Typically, and as in Lambertini (2003), opinion 
polls do not poll for the continuation of the government, which is the crucial variable in the literature on the strategic 
use of deficits or debt, but for the intention of the electorate to vote for a specific party or a specific candidate. 
Therefore, although opinion polls can be used to estimate the probability of electoral defeat in a two-party system, this 
is not obvious in a multi-party system as in our dataset. 
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this paper we will use the insights of vote function models to estimate the probability of electoral 
defeat of the incumbents. If they expect not to remain in power, the incumbents could decide to 
act strategically. 
 
In our analysis we estimate the prospects of electoral defeat from the Vermeir & Heyndels‟ (2006) 
vote function for Flemish municipalities. To test whether yardstick voting is present in Flemish 
municipalities, Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) empirically analyse the votes at municipal elections. 
They find that incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Moreover, the electoral punishment 
depends on the tax rates in neighbouring municipalities, so empirical evidence of yardstick 
competition is provided. Next to the tax variables –the focus of the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) 
research– their analysis also contains political and economic variables. As such their model is a 
good starting point given the purpose of this paper.  
 
Still, our aim is not explaining votes, but estimating the incumbents‟ judgement of their electoral 
prospects. Next we introduce these prospects in the explanation of debt policy changes in election 
years. Therefore we first reconstruct Vermeir & Heyndels‟ (2006) vote function. Second, we will 
apply this function on the pre-electoral years‟ values of its explanatory variables to calculate the 
government‟s vote expectations. This adjustment is necessary as Flemish local governments have 
to endorse the (Balanced) Budget before December 31 of the year before. If incumbents would 
like to act strategically in the election year, changes in the level of debt thus should be agreed on in 
the year before elections. The decision whether or not to change local debt strategically in election 
year t thus has to be made in year t-1. Indeed, incumbents have to judge their electoral prospects 
one year before elections. Given both the role of each of the explanatory variables in the vote 
percentage and their values in the pre-election year t-1, we can generate the expected number of 
votes of the government at the timing of the Budget. 
 
First, we reconstruct Vermeir & Heyndels‟ (2006) vote function estimation as presented in 
equation (I.) that explains the percentage of votes the incumbent party (or parties9) receives at the 
elections in year t : 
 
(I.) Vit =  α1 + α2 Vit-6 + α3 TAXit + α4 NTAXit + α5 EXPit + α6 NEXPit + α7 NTIit + α8 
UNEMPLit + α9 NPARit + year dummies + party dummies + uit  
 where: i = 1,..., N; t = election years  
 
Vit represents the vote percentage of the government party (parties) of municipality i in election year t. 
The first explanatory variable is the vote percentage of the same government party (parties) in the 
previous elections (Vit-6). The coefficient of Vit-6 is expected to have a positive impact on the number of 
                                                 
9  The vote share corresponds with the sum of the shares of the coalition partners in the case of coalition governments. 
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votes.10 TAXit is a vector of tax instruments and includes the local income tax rate (LITRit) and the 
local property tax rate (LPTRit). We expect the tax rates to have a negative impact on the vote 
percentage. Per capita public expenditure (EXPit) is included to measure for the quantity (and/or 
quality) of public output. A positive impact on the votes is expected from this. We refer to the theory 
of yardstick voting –which suggests that voters compare their own municipality to their neighbouring 
municipalities when deciding on their vote (Besley & Case, 1995 and Revelli, 2002)– to include tax 
variables of neighbouring municipalities (NTAXit). We introduce the average local tax rates of the 
neighbouring municipalities (LITRNit and LPTRNit)
11. Also the average per capita expenditures 
(NEXPit) of the neighbouring municipalities is introduced. Average local tax rates of neighbouring 
municipalities are expected to positively affect the votes, while negative values are anticipated for the 
average per capita expenditures of the neighbouring municipalities. As the literature on economic 
voting suggests that governments are held accountable for economic developments, net taxable 
income (NTIit) and the unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) are introduced.
12 Income is expected to have 
a positive effect on votes, while the opposite is true for unemployment. Political characteristics enter 
vote function (I.) through the number of government parties (NPARit) which measure for clarity of 
accountability.13 More coalition partners are expected to reduce transparency. Fragmented 
governments are thus held less accountable for positive and negative developments (Powell & Whitten, 
1993). As governments are more punished for negative developments than they are rewarded for 
positive developments, Nicholson & Segura (2002) show that fragmented governments generally suffer 
smaller electoral losses. A positive effect of the number of government parties on the vote is thus 
expected. The possibility of vote swings among government parties is another possible explanation for 
a positive coefficient as it is less clear which party voters might hold responsible for policy. Year 
dummies are introduced to capture possible year effects.14 Finally, party year dummies are introduced, 
as Heath et al. (1999), Jérôme & Lewis-Beck (1999) and Revelli (2002) show that local election results 
reflect national party popularity rather than the appreciation of local developments and policies. The 
impact of national or regional politics on local elections is captured by the inclusion of party dummies 
                                                 
10  Two remarks concerning this variable. First, this variable is not strictly a lagged dependent variable. This could be a 
lagged dependent variable, but only when the previous government stayed in office. Second, the definition of this 
variable implies that the dataset does not contain data of all Flemish municipalities. Sometimes it is impossible to 
calculate previous election results of the government. Parties may split up, merge with another party or change their 
names. Also parties can disappear and not compete in next elections or a member of the government can change 
parties. The dataset –that corresponds with that of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006)– only contains observations of which 
previous election results can be indisputably calculated. We thus are confronted with an unbalanced panel as we do not 
have observations for every election in every municipality. Finally our dataset contains 688 observations of 294 (out of 
308) municipalities. 
11  All “neighbouring” variables are estimated as the unweighted average of the values of the Flemish neighbouring 
municipalities. For Flemish municipalities across the language boundary, only Flemish neighbours are taken into 
account. 
12  Remark that these economic variables are the result of macro-economic policy which is mainly a federal and regional 
responsibility. Despite their objective to interfere local governments may still have a (marginal) influence or may be held 
accountable by the electorate. Local governments can e.g. approve the layout of additional company grounds or decide 
to lower local company taxes to stimulate local economic activity. 
13  Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) do not enter a measure for the government‟s ideology in their vote-function. We tested the 
impact of the ideological complexion of the government on the votes but find no significant effect. 
14  Year effects are introduced to measure the electoral change common to all governments in a certain year, e.g. the 
electoral rise of the extremist party Vlaams Blok (Vlaams Belang). 
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for the five national parties that participated in municipal governments and this for each election 
year.15  
 
We intend to use the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) vote function as an instrument to estimate the 
probability of electoral defeat. Therefore, we first reconstruct the results of Vermeir & Heyndels‟ 
(2006) vote function as close as possible. They tested different approaches, including pooled OLS 
regressions, OLS regressions including fixed municipality effects, 2SLS regressions with and 
without municipality fixed effects and conclude that their preference goes to the 2SLS regression 
without municipality effects (Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2295).16 Therefore we estimate equation 
(I.) technically analogous to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) and use a 2SLS approach without 
municipality effects in which internal and neighbouring tax variables are instrumented.17 Frey & 
Schneider (1978) and Schneider & Pommerehne (1980) show that tax variables in the UK and 
Australia respectively may not be assumed to be exogenous, as the level of popularity affects tax 
policy. We thus may expect that the error term is correlated with the tax rates. Neighbouring tax 
variables are instrumented because the presence of spatial correlation in the error is suggested by 
Revelli (2002) and Solé Ollé (2003) in their models on tax mimicking. We follow Vermeir & 
Heyndels (2006) by instrumenting own tax rates and per capita expenditures by the percentage of 
young people and elderly, the average sale price of small and middle sized houses and the number 
of inhabitants. Tax rates and per capita expenditures of neighbouring municipalities are similarly 
instrumented. The Sargan tests on the validity of the instruments indicate that the instruments are 
valid.18 Table 1 presents the results of the estimation. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables are shown in Table A1 on p. 30  in appendix. 
 
                                                 
15  We introduced dummies for the liberal democratic VLD, for the social democratic SP.a, for the Christian democratic 
CD&V, for the ecologist GROEN! and for the nationalist VU. The extreme-right Vlaams Blok (Vlaams Belang) 
participates in none of the local governments. Some of these parties changed their name during or after the years under 
investigation.  
16  We refer to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) for an overview of the results of all tested approaches. 
17  These “neighbouring tax variables” are the local income tax rate, the local property tax rate and per capita expenditures. 
18  The Sargan test tests the validity of the instrumental variables. Under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid –
they are uncorrelated to some set of residuals– the Sargan statistic is Chi² distributed with R degrees of freedom (R 
being the number of instruments minus the number of estimated parameters). If we fail to reject the hypothesis –which 
is the case in our model, since p exceeds the value 0.10– the instruments are acceptable.  
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Table 1 IV estimation of the vote share of the government parties in election year t 
 
Dependent variable :  
Vote share of the government parties (Vit) 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
Intercept 
40.814 
(1.67) 
* 15.233 
(1.22) 
 
Prior vote (Vit-6) 
0.760 
(15.91) 
*** 0.757 
(17.89) 
*** 
Local income tax rate (LITRit) 
-6.733 
(-2.08) 
** -5.413 
(-3.51) 
*** 
Local property tax rate (LPTRit) 
0.003 
(0.18) 
 
- 
 
Per capita expenditures (EXPit) 
-2.642 
(-0.39) 
 
- 
 
Local income tax rate neighbours (LITRNit) 
4.977 
(0.81) 
 7.050 
(2.71) 
*** 
Local property tax rate neighbours (LPTRNit) 
-0.004 
(-0.17) 
 
- 
 
Per capita expenditures neighbours (NEXPit) 
-17.077 
(-2.46) 
** -12.643 
(-3.12) 
*** 
Net taxable income (NTIit) 
-1.978 
(-1.55) 
 -1.666 
(-3.18) 
*** 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) 
-2.481 
(-0.03) 
 
- 
 
Number of government parties (NPARit) 
2.197 
(1.73) 
* 2.157 
(3.60) 
*** 
1994 year effect (Y94) 
5.916 
(2.08) 
** 
- 
 
2000 year effect (Y00) 
3.292 
(1.02) 
 
- 
 
Party effects Yes  Yes 19 
Wald test party effects : F (p-value) 
1.355 
(p=0.17) 
 8.520 
(p<0.01) 
20 
R² 0.238  0.298  
Adjusted R² 0.208  0.291  
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 
2.529 
(p=0.28) 
 2.372 
(p=0.80) 
 
Note : N=688; Values in parentheses are t-values (except for Sargan and Wald tests, where p-
values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
 
In this table, column (1) provides the most general results, while in column (2) only the statistically 
significant variables are maintained and as such provide the most efficient estimation. We focus on 
the latter. The prior vote (Vit-6), the municipality‟s own local income tax rate (LITRit), the average 
local income tax rate in the neighbouring municipalities (LITRNit), the average per capita 
expenditure in the neighbouring municipalities (NEXPit), the net taxable income (NTIit) and the 
number of parties (NPARit) have a significant impact on the vote percentage of government 
parties. All significant variables have the expected signs and the coefficients are highly comparable 
to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006).21 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that local tax policy has an impact on election results. The regression 
results show that the government‟s local income tax rate negatively influences the vote percentage. 
                                                 
19  Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) present results with and without party-year dummies. As their regression with party-year 
dummies has the highest adjusted R², we reconstruct their model including those dummies. 
20  Insignificant party dummies are left out. The Wald test is performed for the remaining party dummies. 
21  We compare to Vermeir & Heyndels‟ (2006) 2SLS results as presented in column (4) of (their) Table 5 (on p. 2294). 
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High local income tax rates are thus electorally costly, while there is no evidence that local 
property tax rates have an impact on the votes for the government. 
 
The average local income tax rate of the neighbouring municipalities affects the vote percentage 
positively, so voters use the tax policies of surrounding municipalities as a yardstick. Per capita 
expenditures in neighbouring municipalities have a negative effect on the vote percentage, while 
there is no significant impact of the expenditure level in the municipality itself.  
 
Also political variables are of importance when explaining the vote percentage. The number of 
government parties presents a positive coefficient, confirming that fragmented governments lose 
fewer votes. With regard to the party-year effects, we only find the dummy for the liberal party in 
2000 to present a significant coefficient.22 
 
Finally, there is evidence that voters hold local governments responsible for macro-economic 
policy as NTIit has a significant negative sign. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006; 2292) refer to the 
„clientele hypothesis‟ by Rattinger (Rattinger, 1981 & 1991) as this may explain that “at lower levels 
of income, voters tend to stay with or go back to traditional government parties”. The lack of a 
significant impact of UNEMPLit suggests that voters do not hold local governments responsible 
for employment policy. Indeed, “most policy instruments to fight unemployment are in the hands 
of the federal an regional government”(Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2292). 
 
The next step is to generate the forecasted values of the vote percentage. For each observation we 
generate the forecasted value of the vote percentage from the vote function as estimated in Table 1 
using one year lagged values for the explanatory variables. 
 
In Table A2 on p. 30 we present some statistics on both the forecasted values resulting from the 
preceding analysis (Vfit)23 and the outcome of elections (Vit). Mean, median and maximum values 
are highly comparable. The histograms show that also the frequency distribution of both series is 
comparable. The correlation between the two values is 0.62. Whether or not these forecasted 
values explain strategic debt policy is estimated in the following section. 
 
                                                 
22  The coefficient of this dummy is 3.761 (t=2.92, p<0.01) providing evidence that the Liberal party benefits at the local 
level from its electoral success at the Federal and regional government level. At both government levels, The Liberal 
party won the 1999 elections, re-entered the governing coalitions and delivered the prime ministers.  
23  To indicate that we use forecasted values, we add an “f” to Vit. 
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4.3 Strategic use of debt 
 
In this section we test for the existence of the strategic use of debt in Flemish municipalities. In 
general, we look for evidence whether or not the change in debt in election years is directed by the 
government‟s vote expectation. The theory of the strategic use of debt predicts governments not 
expecting to be re-elected in the next election to change debt. If so, the change of debt in election 
years should be a function of the governments‟ re-election prospects. To empirically test this 
hypothesis, we run regression (II.), which explains debt policy changes in election years:  
 
(II.) ΔDEBTit = 1 + 2 PEDit + Xit + uit ;       
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994, 2000 
 
The dependent variable ΔDEBTit measures the year-to-year change in debt per capita in election 
years and is explained by the probability of electoral defeat (PEDit) and some control variables 
(Xit).  
 
We build on the estimation of the vote percentage (Vfit) from the previous section to take into 
account the government‟s prospects of electoral defeat. We transform Vfit to a dummy variable 
(PEDit) that takes value 1 if the government does not expect to get a majority of the votes at the 
next elections and thus is expected to be voted out of office and 0 if it expects to get its 
mandate renewed. In other words, this dummy variable gets value 1 if the forecasted vote 
percentage (Vfit) is below majority (Vfit<50%) and 0 otherwise. This operationalisation is inspired 
by Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) who find that governing coalitions whose parties obtain a 
majority in an election usually remain in office. In line with Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) we 
assume that governments that regain a majority of the votes stay in office, while those who fail in 
that objective are replaced by a new government. Dummy variable PEDit takes this assumption 
into account.  
 
Like Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), we try to discriminate between the PS and AT models. According 
to the AT model we may expect governments with expectations of defeat to issue debt irrespective 
of their political ideologies. Conversely, the PS model predicts that only rightist governments issue 
debt when they expect to be replaced, while leftist governments are expected to do the opposite. 
The introduction of an interaction variable with product terms PEDit on the one hand and dummy 
variable LEFTMAJit on the other hand permits to distinguish between the two models. 
  16 
LEFTMAJit equals 1 if leftist parties have at least 50% of the seats in the College and 0 
otherwise.24 To test these different models we extend equation (II.) to : 
 
(III.) ΔDEBTit = 1 + 2 PEDit + 3 LEFTMAJit * PEDit + 4 LEFTMAJit + Xit + uit ;   
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years 
 
To find out whether our analysis presents evidence of the strategic use of debt, then in estimation 
(III.) we should focus on 2 and 3. Whether strategic debt behavior is in line with the AT or the 
PS model depends on the interpretation of both coefficients simultaneously. If 2 is significantly 
positive, while the interaction variable 3 remains insignificant, there is support for the AT model, 
as governments –irrespective of their political ideologies– expecting an electoral defeat increase 
debt. Should the following three conditions be fulfilled, that is 2 is significantly positive, 3 is 
significantly negative and (2 + 3) is negative, there is evidence for the PS model, in which leftist 
governments anticipating an electoral defeat decrease debt, while other governments with the same 
prospects increase debt.  
 
Variable Xit in equation (III.) stands for variables affecting debt policy. Although we expect 
strategic motivations for the change of debt, other determinants may also explain this change.  
 
First we take into account the level of debt in pre-election years (DEBTit-1). This variable can have 
opposing effects on the level of debt changes. On the one hand we may assume that governments 
with low debts have more “margin” to increase debt than governments with higher debt levels. 
Conversely, highly indebted governments are expected to be more unresponsive to increase debt 
as this would worsen their financial position all the more. An additional increase of debt raises –
ceteris paribus– the cost of debt, that for its part may lead to an additional need for debt financing. 
Still this expected unresponsiveness may be unrealistic. Indeed, high levels of debt may become 
self-reinforcing. This is called the  “snow ball effect” and should result in a positive sign. The sign of 
DEBTit-1 thus is a priori unknown. 
 
The change in the inhabitants‟ net taxable income (ΔNTIit), measured as the year-to-year change in 
the net taxable income per capita, can have two (opposing) effects on the evolution of the level of 
debt (Ashworth et al., 2005). On the one hand ΔNTIit is an indication of the change of the fiscal 
capacity of the municipality –as much of the local revenue comes from local income tax. An 
increase of the net taxable income may reduce the need for loan financing, thus a  negative sign 
                                                 
24  For the definition of our dummy variable LEFTMAJit we take into account the number of seats of the Socialists and of 
the Ecologists. Deschouwer (1996) & Rihoux (2001) position the Christian Democrats, the Nationalists and local 
parties at the centre. The Ecologists and the Socialists are at the left of the centre, while the Liberals are at the right of 
the centre. The anti-immigrant party Vlaams Blok is at the extreme right of the spectrum. Thus in our analysis, we 
distinguish between leftist parties (LEFTMAJit=1) and parties on the centre or on the right of the centre 
(LEFTMAJit=0). This approach is in line with Pettersson-Lidbom (2001). 
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can be expected. On the other hand, ΔNTIit may indicate changes in the demand for public goods 
and may increase this need for debt financing. This may lead to a positive sign (Geys, 2007). 
Taking both effects together, the sign of ΔNTIit is a priori uncertain. 
 
Not only changes in the taxable income, also changes in demographic and socio-economic variables 
may lead to changes in the demand for public expenditures and have an effect on debt evolution 
(Ashworth et al., 2005 & Geys, 2007). Therefore we introduce the changes in the proportion of 
young inhabitants (ΔYOUNGit), changes in the proportion of elderly inhabitants (ΔOLDit), 
changes in the unemployment rate (ΔUNEMPLit) and changes in the number of inhabitants 
(ΔPOPit) in estimation (III.). These variables are the year-on-year change of the percentage of 
inhabitants that are, respectively, below 20, over 64 and unemployed and the year-on-year change 
of the number of inhabitants. Each time positive coefficients are expected because higher levels of 
young, elderly and unemployed could represent a higher demand for specific heavy capital 
expenditures such as schools, care of the elderly or social housing, leading to higher levels of 
public debt (Bahl & Duncombe, 1993), while an increase in the number of inhabitants represents 
the need for additional public services and infrastructure in general. 
 
The change of debt may also respond to the financial costs of borrowing (Ashworth et al., 2005 & 
Geys, 2007). The idea is that an increasing cost of borrowing restrains rational governments from 
increasing debt financing. Besides the level of debt, borrowing costs depend on the real interest 
rate on long-term (federal) government bonds. We introduce this rate‟s year-to-year change 
(ΔINTERESTit) to measure changes in the cost of borrowing. A negative sign is expected.25  
 
Also political variables have received attention as determinants of debt policy before (see e.g. 
Alesina & Perotti, 1994; Gärtner, 2000; Ashworth et al., 2005). In our regression, ideological 
differences are taken into account by the introduction of dummy LEFTMAJit. We expect a 
positive value here, as in public finance literature it is widely accepted (see Hibbs, 1977) that leftist 
governments have higher spending, which we may assume that they are at least partly financed by 
debt. Leftist governments thus are expected to increase debt more easily. Higher spending may 
also be expected for fragmented governments. The Weak Government Hypothesis (Roubini & 
Sachs, 1989a,b) attributes higher public spending to more fragmented (or divided) governments 
because several conflicting political objectives have to be accommodated. Fragmentation thus may 
more easily lead to an increase in debt. We introduce the number of government parties (NPARit) 
to measure the effect of fragmentation. However, its effect on ΔDEBTit may not be linear. We 
refer to Ashworth et al. (2005 & 2006), Geys (2007) and Goeminne et al. (2008) who have 
previously found a non-linear effect of government fragmentation on Flemish local governments‟ 
fiscal decision-making. As a matter of fact Geys (2007; 246) finds that “in election years […] the 
                                                 
25  Note that the interest rate varies over time but not over municipalities, it thus can only explain within municipality 
variation and not between municipality variation. 
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growth rate of local public debt is lower for one-party governments compared to large coalitions”. 
Consequently, we then test a non linear specification, adding the squared term NPAR²it.  
  
Finally we introduce year-dummies to capture year effects.  
 
Replacing Xit in equation (III.) with these control variables, we estimate the following equation:  
 
(IV.) ΔDEBTit =  1 + 2 PEDit + 3 LEFTMAJit * PEDit + 4 LEFTMAJit + 5 DEBTit-1 + 6 
ΔNTIit + 7 ΔYOUNGit + 8 ΔOLDit + 9 ΔUNEMPLit +  10 ΔPOPit + 11 
ΔINTERESTit + 12 NPARit + + 13 NPAR²it  + year dummiest + uit ;  
 where : i = 1,..., N; t = election years  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the debt change estimation. A linear regression on panel data with 
random effects is implemented and covers data from 294 of the 308 Flemish municipalities.26 
Since our number of years is small and the number of cross-sectional units is rather large, random 
effects model estimators are more efficient than fixed effects model estimators (Gujarati, 2003; 
651). Moreover, introducing a fixed effects model would be expensive in terms of degrees of 
freedom since we have only three time series of data. The Hausman tests we present also suggest 
that it is safe to use random effects.27 
 
Before estimating our model, we test for the existence of multicollinearity in our dataset. Therefore 
we run a correlation analysis. The correlation matrix indicated that the pair wise correlation 
coefficient of ΔYOUNGit and the year dummy for 2000 (r=-0.97) exceeds the suggested threshold 
of |r|>0.80 (see Gujarati, 2003; 359). Therefore we shift the year dummy from the analysis. 
 
Table 2 presents results of the OLS estimation (with random effects) of per capita debt change in 
election years. Column (1) presents results including all variables. A more efficient regression in 
which insignificant variables are omitted is presented in column (2). Descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables are shown in Table A3 on p. 31 in appendix. 
 
                                                 
26  We continue on the dataset used to estimate the vote-function. In addition we lose one more observation as we do not 
have data for the level of debt per capita in 1993 for the municipality Aarschot. 
27  A Hausman test controls whether the H0 that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are the same as 
the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. The insignificant p-values presented in our model indicate that we fail 
to reject the H0 and allows us to use random effects. 
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Table 2 Estimation results of the debt change function, using OLS with random effects 
 
Dependent variable : ΔDebtit (1)  (2)  
Intercept 
-1.327 
(-0.05) 
 34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 
PEDit 
6.500 
(0.69) 
 
- 
 
PEDit * LEFTMAJit  
-9.536 
(-0.39) 
 
- 
 
LEFTMAJit 
-4.827 
(-0.34) 
 
- 
 
DEBTit-1 
0.018 
(1.62) 
 
- 
 
ΔNTIit 
55.006 
(1.44) 
 
- 
 
ΔYOUNGit 
2973.019 
(2.07) 
** 3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 
ΔOLDit 
5345.037 
(2.085) 
** 5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 
ΔUNEMPLit 
17.770 
(0.03) 
 
- 
 
ΔPOPit 
0.003 
(1.34) 
 
- 
 
ΔINTERESTit 
127.806 
(2.44) 
** 147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 
NPARit 
22.964 
(0.94) 
 
-  
NPAR²it 
-5.585 
(-0.94) 
 
-  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-45.681 
(-1.48) 
 -57.034 
(-1.88) 
* 
R² 0.055  0.043  
Adjusted R² 0.036  0.038  
Hausman (p-value) 11.52 (p=0.56) 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values 
are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
 
Before focusing on the strategic debt hypotheses, we cast a quick glance at the control variables. First 
we refer to the absence of significant coefficients of the fragmentation variables. Government 
fragmentation thus seems to have no impact on debt changes in election years. Turning to the other 
control variables, we find significant positive coefficients for ΔYOUNGit, ΔOLDit and 
ΔINTERESTit. For ΔYOUNGit and ΔOLDit this sign is in line with the expectations. If the 
percentage of young and elderly in the entire population changes by 1%, debt changes in the same 
way by respectively 32.59 and 55.59 euros per capita. For ΔINTERESTit a negative coefficient was 
anticipated. While we expected governments to restrain from increasing debt financing when the 
cost of borrowing increases, the results show that an increase of the borrowing cost (by 1%) results 
in an increase of debt (per capita of 147.18 euros). Obviously governments do not succeed in 
reducing debt when costs increase, on the contrary they seem to engage additional debt to finance 
the increased cost of borrowing. This is in line with the so-called “snowball effect” and shows the 
perverse effect that high interest rates may have on indebtedness. This effect is also found by 
Ashworth et al. (2005) and Geys (2007). There is no indication that DEBTit-1, ΔNTIit, ΔUNEMPLit 
or ΔPOPit affect debt changes in election years. Nor LEFTMAJit presents a significant coefficient. 
Finally, the dummy variable for the year 1994 does present a significant coefficient. The negative 
value of this coefficient suggests that in that year debt increases are less strong. 
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Focusing on the strategic debt hypotheses, we do not find support for the strategic use of debt in 
Flemish municipalities. The most efficient estimation shows that governments that do not expect 
re-election have no significantly different level of debt in election years, as PEDit fails to present a 
significant coefficient. Neither the interaction variable (PEDit * LEFTMAJit) is significant. From 
this results there is no indication that Flemish municipalities that do not expect to get a majority of 
the votes strategically change debt in election years.  
 
5. Extensions 
 
The findings in the previous section fail to confirm the existence of strategic use of debt in 
Flemish municipalities. Still, some extended analyses could be done.  
 
First, we test different levels of vote expectations to construct PED it. We should remark that the 
construct presented above tests whether or not governments with vote expectations below 50% 
change debt policy in election years. First, this assumes that governments who are confident of 
staying into office are not expected to change debt strategically. This seems reasonable. Second, 
this also assumes a generalisation of all governments with vote expectations below 50% of who we 
do expect to change debt strategically. Maybe this assumption is too strict. Indeed, despite vote 
expectations below 50%, their behavior may be mutually divergent. Especially governments with 
low vote expectations are expected to engage in strategic debt policy. On the contrary, 
governments with vote expectations only just below 50% may believe they will be able to attract 
additional votes necessary to get back into office and will not change debt strategically. Then the 
question is at what level of vote expectations governments without re-election expectations change 
debt strategically? We rerun the analyse above with a multitude of PEDxit dummies that cover the 
governments with vote-expectations below x-percent. In fact, in Table 3 we reconstruct PEDit to 
test whether governments with vote expectations below 49% (PED49it), below 48% (PED48it),… 
etc. change debt strategically.28 This enables us to test if the strategic debt effect is absent in 
general or if it kicks in at a lower level of vote expectations.  
 
Some remarks on the presentation of the results of this approach in Table 3. First, in column (1) 
we present the results when taking PED50it into account as a proxy for the probability of electoral 
defeat. This corresponds (of course) with the results as presented in Table 2. Second, we do not 
run regressions for governments with vote expectations below 40% as the Hausman test suggests 
that random effects are not appropriate anymore below that level.29 For reasons of comparability 
we only present random effects results. Third, to provide a general view of the results of these 
additional analyses in one single table, we only present estimation results of the most efficient 
regressions (thus leaving out insignificant variables).30  
                                                 
28  These dummy variable gets value 1 if the forecasted vote percentage (Vfit) is below 49%, 48%,… etc. (thus Vfit<x%) and 
0 otherwise. 
29  Table A4 on p. 31 presents the number of observations for each PEDxit operationalisation. The number of observations 
with PEDxit = 1 reduces from 195 for PED50it to 32 for PED41it. 
30  When an interaction term is significant, the constitutive variables of the interaction model remains included regardless 
of whether they are significant. Insignificant constitutive variables are shown in italic. 
   
 
Table 3 Estimation results of the debt change function given different levels of vote expectations, using OLS with random effects 
 
Dependent variable : ΔDebtit 
(1)  
PED50it 
 
(2)  
PED49it 
 
(3)  
PED48it 
 
(4) 
 PED47it 
 
(5)  
PED46it 
 
(6)  
PED45it 
 
(7)  
PED44it 
 
(8)  
PED43it 
 
(9)  
PED42it 
 
(10)  
PED41it 
 
Intercept 
34.481 
(5.20) 
*** 20.917 
(2.21) 
** 20.938 
(2.22) 
** 21.291 
(2.27) 
** 21.077 
(2.25) 
** 20.477 
(2.18) 
** 21.691 
(2.30) 
** 21.558 
(2.29) 
** 21.924 
(2.33) 
** 20.891 
(2.24) 
** 
PEDxit 
-  11.439 
(1.21) 
 16.286 
(1.65) 
 15.739 
(1.48) 
 18.982 
(1.65) 
 16.643 
(1.30) 
 4.443 
(0.32) 
 7.287 
(0.48) 
 3.962 
(0.22) 
 16.815 
(0.86) 
 
PEDxit * LEFTMAJit  
-  -59.751 
(-2.29) 
** -55.567 
(-1.90) 
* -58.297 
(-1.88) 
* -61.589 
(-1.96) 
* -91.759 
(-2.49) 
** -80.002 
(-2.04) 
** -82.882 
(-2.08) 
** -79.329 
(-1.84) 
* -107.182 
(-2.34) 
** 
LEFTMAJit 
-  6.864 
(0.53) 
 2.924 
(0.23) 
 1.647 
(0.13) 
 1.695 
(0.14) 
 1.968 
(0.16) 
 -0.320 
(-0.03) 
 -0.208 
(-0.02) 
 -1.177 
(-0.10) 
 -0.703 
(-0.06) 
 
DEBTit-1 
-  0.020 
(1.80) 
* 0.021 
(1.82) 
* 0.021 
(1.85) 
* 0.021 
(1.88) 
* 0.023 
(2.00) 
** 0.023 
(2.01) 
** 0.023 
(2.02) 
** 0.023 
(2.00) 
** 0.024 
(2.12) 
** 
ΔNTIit - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ΔYOUNGit 
3259.128 
(2.30) 
** 3395.893 
(2.39) 
** 3198.296 
(2.26) 
** 3263.821 
(2.30) 
** 3208.123 
(2.27) 
** 3295.086 
(2.33) 
** 3228.155 
(2.28) 
** 3241.853 
(2.29) 
** 3162.543 
(2.23) 
** 3179.011 
(2.25) 
** 
ΔOLDit 
5559.006 
(2.20) 
** 5203.282 
(2.06) 
** 5145.907 
(2.04) 
** 5257.696 
(2.08) 
** 5325.530 
(2.11) 
** 5280.077 
(2.09) 
** 4996.167 
(1.97) 
** 4997.827 
(1.97) 
** 5098.493 
(2.02) 
** 5009.259 
(1.99) 
** 
ΔUNEMPLit - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ΔPOPit - 
 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ΔINTERESTit 
147.184 
(2.89) 
*** 142.710 
(2.76) 
*** 134.103 
(2.60) 
*** 135.964 
(2.64) 
*** 133.687 
(2.59) 
*** 137.024 
(2.66) 
*** 136.111 
(2.64) 
*** 136.336 
(2.64) 
*** 133.473 
(2.59) 
*** 133.343 
(2.59) 
*** 
NPARit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
NPAR²it -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Time dummy variable (1994) 
-57.034 
(-1.88) 
* -56.044 
(-1.84) 
* -52.259 
(-1.72) 
* -53.145 
(-1.75) 
* -51.997 
(-1.71) 
* -52.801 
(-1.74) 
* -51.980 
(-1.71) 
* -52.163 
(-1.72) 
* -51.064 
(-1.68) 
* -50.92 
(-1.68) 
* 
R² 0.043  0.054  0.054  0.053  0.054  0.056  0.053  0.053  0.052  0.055  
Adjusted R² 0.038  0.043  0.042  0.042  0.043  0.045  0.042  0.042  0.041  0.043  
Hausman 
10.89 
(p=0.54) 
 11.88 
(p=0.45) 
 10.99 
(p=0.53) 
 12.80 
(p=0.38) 
 11.88 
(p=0.45) 
 11.09 
(p=0.52) 
 11.24 
(p=0.50) 
 11.29 
(p=0.50) 
 11.39 
(p=0.50) 
 15.72 
(p=0.20) 
 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
   
 
From Table 3 it is clear that PED50it  indeed was chosen arbitrary. The creation of 
additional dummies for lower vote expectations shows that governments with vote 
expectations below 49% change debt differently than governments with higher vote 
expectations. Still this effect cannot be generalised to the PS or AT model. Yet, for all 
tested operationalisations the PEDxit nor the LEFTMAJit variables are significant, still their 
interaction terms consequently present significant coefficients and thus strongly suggest 
that left-wing governments with bad re-election prospects have different slope coefficients. 
Moreover, the sign of the interaction term is negative, providing evidence that there is a 
negative impact of leftist governments with vote expectations below the appropriate 
percentages on the change of debt in election years. This behavior is in line with the PS 
model, but only for leftist governments not expecting to get into office again. Although it is 
not linear, the overall trend is that the lower the expected votes, the larger is the impact on 
debt changes (from 59.75 euros for PED49it to 107.18 euros per capita for PED41it) or thus 
the stronger the strategic reaction.  
 
If strategic debt policy in line with the PS model is observed for leftist majority 
governments only, then what can be an explanation for the absence of strategic debt 
behavior by the other governments? We suggest this could be explained by the 
consequences of strategic debt behavior on the government‟s favourite policy if contrary to 
the expectations the government does return to office. If –as shown in Table 3– a leftist 
government with bad re-election prospects reduces debt before elections, but unexpectedly 
stays in office, this debt reduction does not prevent the leftist government to prolong its 
favourite policy in the next legislature. Indeed, debt reduction before elections creates 
financial margin to increase expenditures when returning into office. On the contrary, when 
a rightist government with bad re-election prospects increases debt before elections –as the 
PS model predicts– it will be confronted with negative consequences of its behavior on its 
favourite policy if it surprisingly regains majority. Indeed, an increase of the debt not only 
increases future expenditures –by means of reimbursements of the capital and the interest 
payments– it also foils the financial margin for tax reductions a rightist government is 
traditionally in favour of. Therefore, leftist governments are more expected to change debt 
strategically. 
 
With respect to the control variables, the results are comparable to these in Table 2.  
DEBTit-1 presents a significant positive coefficient indicating a positive effect of the level of 
debt in the year before elections on debt changes in election years. This positive sign may 
be another indicator of the “snow ball effect” suggesting that high levels of debt become 
self-reinforcing. 
 
   
 
In a second extension we perform an additional test concerning the role of government 
fragmentation. As can be seen in Table 2 on p. 19, there is no significant impact of 
government fragmentation. Still, this does not necessarily mean that fragmentation has no 
impact at all on strategic debt behavior. It can play a role in strategic debt behavior too by 
means of a different reaction of a single party government and of a coalition government 
confronted with the same probability of electoral defeat. As can be seen from the 
discussion on p. 6 there are opposing expectations about the role of fragmentation on the 
strategic use of debt. To test these hypotheses, we rerun our regressions separately for 
single party governments and for coalition governments. Results are presented in Table 4 in 
columns (1) to (3) for single party governments and columns (4) to (10) for coalition 
governments. Some remarks on the presentation of the results. First, when focussing on 
single party governments, LEFTMAJit and its interaction term with PED50it and PED49it are 
exact collinear. This indicates that all single party governments with a leftist majority have 
vote expectations below 49%. Indeed, when examining the dataset, the highest vote 
expectation of a single party government with a leftist majority is 48.92%. This makes it 
impossible to run the regressions including the test of strategic debt behavior including 
PED50it or PED49it. Consequently we present results starting with PED48it. Also for single 
party governments, results are limited to PED38it as there are no single party governments 
with a leftist majority that have vote expectations below 37%. Second, we do not run 
regressions for coalition governments with vote expectations below 43% as the Hausman 
test suggest that random effects are not appropriate anymore below that level. Again we 
only present random effects results for reasons of comparability. Finally, as in Table 3 we 
only present estimation results of the most efficient regressions (thus leaving out 
insignificant variables).31 
 
                                                 
31  When an interaction term is significant, the constitutive variables of the interaction model remains included 
regardless of whether they are significant. Insignificant constitutive variables are shown in italic. 
   
 
Table 4 Estimation results of the debt change function given different levels of vote expectations in single party governments, using OLS with random effects 
 
 Single Party Governments (N= 326) Coalition governments (N=361) 
Dependent variable : ΔDebtit 
(1)  
PED50it - 
PED49it  
 
(2)  
PED48it 
 
(3) 
PED47it 
PED38it  
  
(4) 
PED50it 
 
(5)  
PED49it 
 
(6)  
PED48it 
 
(7)  
PED47it 
 
(8)  
PED46it 
 
(9)  
PED45it 
 
(10)  
PED44it 
 
Intercept - 
 6.046 
(0.39) 
 17.302 
(1.21) 
 31.591 
(3.43) 
*** 30.123 
(3.13) 
*** 31.268 
(3.24) 
*** 31.540 
(3.28) 
*** 33.299 
(3.65) 
*** 32.674 
(3.42) 
*** 33.600 
(3.51) 
*** 
PEDxit - 
 10.559 
(0.86) 
 
-  - 
 24.243 
(1.35) 
 33.638 
(1.76) 
* 33.872 
(1.59) 
 
- 
 22.706 
(0.874) 
 3.791 
(0.13) 
 
PEDxit * LEFTMAJit  - 
 -241.10 
(-2.24) 
** 
-  - 
 -97.284 
(-2.82) 
*** -73.095 
(-1.74) 
* -83.422 
(-1.85) 
* 
- 
 -180.921 
(-2.92) 
*** -220.397 
(-2.94) 
*** 
LEFTMAJit - 
 207.844 
(2.06) 
** 
-  - 
 6.450 
(0.47) 
 -0.490 
(-0.04) 
 -1.346 
(-0.10) 
 
- 
 -0.836 
(-0.06) 
 -2.705 
(-0.21) 
 
DEBTit-1 - 
 0.031 
(1.70) 
* 0.033 
(1.83) 
* 
-  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
ΔNTIit -  
97.222 
(1.71) 
* -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
ΔYOUNGit - 
 
- 
 
- 
 3421.232 
(1.95) 
* 3773.462 
(2.14) 
** 3396.354 
(1.93) 
* 3494.555 
(1.99) 
** 
- 
 3736.464 
(2.12) 
** 3750.392 
(2.13) 
** 
ΔOLDit - 
 5777.578 
(1.92) 
* 
- 
 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ΔUNEMPLit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
ΔPOPit -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
0.005 
(1.78) 
* 
-  - 
 
ΔINTERESTit - 
 
-  -  
186.661 
(2.89) 
*** 199.164 
(3.07) 
** 182.914 
(2.82) 
*** 187.220 
(2.90) 
*** 62.250 
(4.35) 
*** 196.455 
(3.03) 
*** 198.506 
(3.07) 
*** 
Time dummy variable (1994) - 
 38.852 
(3.12) 
*** 
- 
 -75.590 
(-2.02) 
** -82.578 
(-2.21) 
** -75.962 
(-2.02) 
** -77.181 
(-2.06) 
** 
-  
-81.319 
(-2.17) 
** -83.803 
(-2.24) 
** 
R² -  0.086  -  0.060  0.080  0.071  0.070  0.057  0.082  0.085  
Adjusted R² -  0.066  -  0.052  0.065  0.055  0.055  0.052  0.066  0.070  
Hausman - 
 
-32 
 10.922 
(p=0.45) 
 11.70 
(p=0.39) 
 12.07 
(p=0.36) 
 11.36 
(p=0.41) 
 16.73 
(p=0.12) 
 16.66 
(p=0.11) 
 13.68 
(p=0.25) 
 17.26 
(p=0.10) 
 
Note : N=687; t-values between brackets (except for the Hausman tests where p-values are presented); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.  
                                                 
32  Hausman test is set to zero as cross-section test variance is invalid. 
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When reviewing the results for single party governments and for coalition governments, we 
may confirm the idea put forward by Ashworth et al. (2006) that parties in a coalition are on 
average less certain of future power. This may lead them to be more sensitive to the strategic 
use of debt. Indeed, the results in Table 4 confirm that strategic use of debt is particularly 
observed by coalition governments.33 For single party governments, there is no evidence of 
strategic use of debt when vote expectations are below 47%. These findings are opposite to 
those for coalition governments. In general the estimations in Table 4 provide evidence of 
strategic use of debt in coalition governments when vote expectations are below 49%.34 Except 
for the PED48it estimation we again only find leftist majority coalition governments to change 
pre-electoral debt. Comparing the findings for coalition governments in Table 4 with the results 
from Table 3, absolute values of the interaction term‟s (PEDxit * LEFTMAJit) coefficients are 
increased, suggesting stronger effects on the change of debt for coalition governments. We thus 
can conclude that strategic debt behavior is a phenomenon that can be observed especially in 
fragmented government scenarios. This may be due to the fact that as well as the electoral 
results, the ensuing coalition negotiations play a role in whether or not the government can 
continue with the same coalition partners as in the previous term. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper discusses the literature on strategic use of debt models and empirically tests them on 
a dataset of Flemish municipalities. In general the literature on strategic debt models shows that 
the evidence is mixed and we suggest that the lack of an undisputed measure to estimate the 
probability of electoral defeat obstructs the formulation of a general consensus on this matter. 
Most of these measures are based on historical political stability information, which ignores the 
fact that incumbents have to try to estimate what voters have in mind in the voting booth when 
estimating the government‟s probability of electoral defeat. As Baleiras (1997; 202) explicitly 
states “this probability depends on the electorate‟s assessment of the incumbent‟s performance 
while in office”. They thus consider not only historical, but also tax, economic and political 
variables. Therefore we introduce vote functions to estimate the prospects of electoral defeat. 
For the purpose of this paper the vote function of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) is used to 
construct a good proxy for the prospects of electoral defeat. Our main results show that the 
strategic use of debt in Flemish municipalities cannot be undisputedly confirmed. First, 
strategic debt cannot be stated for all governments with vote expectations below 50%. Still it 
can be observed for governments with expected vote percentages below 49%. Second, strategic 
debt changes can only be stated for leftist governments without re-election prospects, while the 
                                                 
33  The absence of significant coefficients for PEDxit, LEFTMAJit and their interaction terms result in the same 
estimation results for each PEDxit estimation when lowering the vote expectations below 47%. Therefore the results 
presented in column (3) count for each level of vote expectations below 47%. 
34  Remark that this is not true for the PED46it estimation. We do not have an idea why the interaction term loses 
significance at the 46-level, while it regains significance at lower levels of vote expectations. 
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seminal models also formulate expectations about governments with opposing ideological 
characteristics. It thus seems that in Flemish municipalities leftist majority governments without 
re-election prospects are sensitive to strategic debt behavior, while this is not true for its 
ideological counterparts. Probably the consequences of debt changes on its own policy when a 
government surprisingly returns to office could explain these findings.  Third, our analyses 
show that strategic debt behavior is more to be expected in the case of coalition governments. 
When running separate analyses for single party governments and for coalition governments, 
we find only significant strategic debt coefficients for the latter. This may be due to the fact 
that coalition governments have both to win the elections and also to survive the ensuing 
coalition negotiations. This increases their uncertainty of returning to office and as a 
consequence their motivation to strategically issue debt.  
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Appendices 
 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the vote function (N=688) and data sources 
 
 Mean Median Max Min Std.dev. Source 
Dep. Var. : Vote share (in %) government parties (Vit ) 54.93 54.05 87.30 24.15 10.18 MICE, VUB35 
Vote share (in%) current government parties at t-6 (Vit-6) 56.24 55.08 88.29 37.25 8.32 MICE, VUB 
Local income tax rate (LITRit) 6.53 6.50 9.00 0.00 0.89 VVSG36 
Local property tax rate (LPTRit) 959.61 950.00 2000.00 170.00 264.79 VVSG 
Per capita expenditures (in €1000) (EXPit)  0.67 0.62 2.18 0.23 0.25 MICE, VUB 
Average local income tax rate of neighbouring 
municipalities (LITRNit) 
6.58 6.57 8.00 3.00 0.51 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Average local property tax rate of neighbouring 
municipalities (LPTRNit) 
975.77 969.08 1650.00 400.00 191.66 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Average per capita expenditures of neighbouring 
municipalities (in €1000) (NEXPit) 
0.69 0.67 1.82 0.42 0.17 
VVSG, matrix of 
MICE, VUB 
Per capita net taxable income (in €1000) (NTIit) 5.49 5.45 8.88 3.21 0.96 MICE, VUB 
Unemployment rate (UNEMPLit) 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.01 CORE, UCL 
Numbers of parties in the government (NPARit) 1.63 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.87 MICE, VUB 
 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics and histograms of forecasted votes (left histogram) and ex-post vote results 
(right histogram) (N=688) 
 
 
 Forecasted votes (Vfit) Ex-post votes (Vit) 
 Mean 55.44 54.93 
 Median 55.08 54.05 
 Maximum 88.46 87.30 
 Minimum 34.04 24.15 
 Std. Dev. 8.71 10.18 
 Correlation 0.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35  MICE (Micro-Economics for Profit and Non Profit Sector) research team of the Faculty of Economic, Social and 
Political Sciences, and Solvay Business School, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. 
36  “Vereniging Vlaamse Steden en Gemeenten”, the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities. 
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Table A3 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the strategic debt estimation (N=688) and data sources 
 
  Mean  Median Max. Min. Std.dev. Source 
Dep. Var. : Change of debt per capita (ΔDEBTit) 61.71 40.03 696.69 -446.52 99.27 MICE, VUB 
Prospects of electoral defeat (PEDit) 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 Own calcul. 
Left majority (LEFTMAJit) 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 
Own calcul. on 
MICE, VUB 
PEDit * LEFTMAJit 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 - 
Debt (p/c) (Debtit-1) 766.93 685.89 3829.52 120.57 373.96 MICE, VUB 
Change of net taxable income (p/c) (ΔNTIit) 0.07 0.07 0.65 -0.70 0.10 FPS Economy 
Change of proportion of elderly (ΔOLDit) 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 FPS Economy 
Change of proportion of young (ΔYOUNGit) -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.01 FPS Economy 
Change of unemployment rate (ΔUNEMPLit) 0.00 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.01 FPS Economy 
Change of number of inhabitants (ΔPOPit) -22.06 1.00 18760.00 -16592.00 1822.24 FPS Economy 
Change of real interest rate on long-term (federal) government 
bonds (ΔINTERESTit) 
0.47 0.63 0.77 0.02 0.33 MICE, VUB 
Actual number of government parties (NPARit) 1.63 2.00 5.00 1.00 0.68 MICE, VUB 
 
Table A4 Number of governments with vote expectations below x percent 
 
Vfit< 35% 36% 37% 38% 39% 40% 41% 42% 43% 44% 45% 46% 47% 48% 49% 50% 
N 1 3 5 7 17 21 32 39 52 62 76 99 118 143 164 195 
 
